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Abstract
Thirty years after the publication of Marr’s seminal book Vision (Marr, 1982) the papers in
this topic consider the contemporary status of his inuential conception of three distinct
levels of analysis for information processing systems, and in particular the role of the
algorithmic and representational level with its cognitive-level concepts. This level has
(either implicitly or explicitly) been downplayed or eliminated both by reductionist
neuroscience approaches (from below) that seek to account for behaviour from the
implementation level and by Bayesian approaches (from above) that seek to account for
behaviour in purely computational-level terms.
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Thirty years after Marr’s Vision: Levels of analysis in Cognitive Science
Introduction
The origin of this topic is a symposium that took place at the 34th Annual Conference
of the Cognitive Science Society in Sapporo in 2012. The aim of the symposium was to
acknowledge the 30th anniversary of David Marr’s landmark posthumous book Vision
(Marr, 1982) and to take the opportunity to consider the contemporary relevance of his
inuential conception of three distinct levels of analysis for information processing systems.
Marr’s “tri-level hypothesis” (Dawson, 1998), that information processing systems can
be analysed in terms of the problems that they solve (Marr’s computational level), the
representations and processes by which they solve them (the algorithmic and
representational level), and the physical instantiation of these representations and processes
(the implementation level) has been reformulated several times in the subsequent thirty
years (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Newell, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1984) and remains a core tenet of
cognitive science.
Although Marr’s proposal is still widely accepted, the rapid developments that have
occurred in neuroscience and Bayesian probabilistic analysis over the last decade have led to
a number of questions being raised concerning the relative value of the three levels of
analysis and the relationships between them. In particular, the role of the algorithmic and
representational level, with its cognitive-level concepts, has (either implicitly or explicitly)
been downplayed or eliminated both by reductionist neuroscience approaches that seek to
account for behaviour without an algorithmic and representation level distinct from the
implementation level (e.g., Bennett & Hacker, 2006) and by Bayesian approaches that model
cognition using probability theory (e.g., Griths, Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008; Oaksford &
Chater, 2007).
This topic brings together eleven contributions that re-examine the role of the
algorithmic and representational level in contemporary cognitive science. Five of those
contributions (Bechtel & Shagrir; Eliasmith & Kolbeck; Gray Hardcastle & Hardcastle;
Griths, Lieder, & Goodman; Love) are based on material presented in the symposium. Six
further contributuions (Anderson; Baggio, van Lambalgen & Hagoort; Bickle; Cooper &
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Peebles; French & Thomas; Samuelson, Jenkins & Spencer) present perspectives not covered
at the Sapporo meeting. The resulting papers represent a range of contemporary responses
from the main disciplines in cognitive science, including philosophy (Bickle; Bechtel &
Shagrir; Gray Hardcastle & Hardcastle), cognitive neuroscience (Love; Baggio, van
Lambalgen & Hagoort), cognitive modelling (Cooper & Peebles; Love; French & Thomas),
neural modelling (Eliasmith & Kolbeck; Gray Hardcastle & Hardcastle), Bayesian modelling
(Griths, Lieder, & Goodman), dynamical systems theory (Samuelson, Jenkins & Spencer)
and vision science (Anderson).
The papers
A number of themes can be discerned from the eleven papers. Two papers discuss the
implications of contemporary theories of emergence for Marr’s tri-level hypothesis. The
rst, by Samuelson, Jenkins and Spencer, does so from the perspective of dynamic systems
theory (specically dynamic eld theory), and argues that the view of cognition and
behaviour as the emergent outcome of the dynamic interaction of multiple components over
time proposed by this approach provides a viable alternative to the traditional Marrian
conception of levels of analysis starting with the computational level.
The second paper, by French and Thomas, identies dynamic interactions across
levels—in particular the bottom-up emergence of higher-level structures from lower level
components, and the subsequent interactions of these emergent structures with the lower
level components from which they emerge—as a property missing from Marr’s analysis that
contemporary cognitive science must address and explain.
Four papers discuss the relationship between theories at dierent levels of analysis,
and in particular what constitutes an appropriate strategy for connecting models at the
computational level with theories at lower levels. Griths, Lieder and Goodman suggest a
top-down strategy which starts by generating the abstract ideal model at the computational
level and then identies models at the algorithmic and representational level that
approximate the ideal solution but which are constrained in terms of the resources available.
In contrast, Love argues that the algorithmic and representational level is the
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appropriate place to develop integrative theories to both the lower and higher levels. He
provides examples of such integration, drawing on research in computational modeling and
neuroimaging, and suggests that the blurring of the boundaries between levels created by
these models may call into question the value of Marr’s tripartite distinction. In a related
vein, Cooper and Peebles, argue that integrated cognitive architectures such as ACT-R that
provide strong, empirically grounded constraints on rational theories and also have
theoretical links with neural level theories and data, are the essential bridge for linking the
algorithmic and representational level to the computational and implementational levels.
The fourth paper of this type, that by Gray Hardcastle and Hardcastle, uses a case
study – a neural model of the cortico-striatal circuitry held to underlie impulsivity and
behavioral inhibition – to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each of Marr’s levels
from the perspective of contemporary cognitive science. While they nd broad support for
Marr’s approach, they also argue for some updating of it. First, they suggest that Marr’s
computational level should be extended to include a description of how the system breaks
down following neural damage. Second, they emphasize that cognition is not a feed-forward
process that is disconnected from behavioral context and driven by the transformation of
representations (as the Marrian approach assumes). This suggests greater interaction
between levels than might follow from a simplistic application of Marrian analysis.
A third theme concerns the nature of specic levels, and in particular the nature of the
computational level. While approaches to this level based on probability theory
supplemented with Bayes’ theorem have been the focus of much recent work (e.g., Griths
et al., 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 2007), this approach has itself also been a target of much
recent criticism (e.g., Bowers & C. J. Davis, 2012; Eberhardt & Danks, 2011; Jones & Love,
2011; Marcus & E. Davis, 2013). Two papers in this topic take issue with Bayesian accounts
of the computational level. Anderson notes the goal-directed nature of the computational
level and criticizes many contemporary (primarily Bayesian) accounts for failing to
distinguish between tasks shaped by natural selection and evolutionary “by-products”. In
contrast, Baggio, van Lambalgen and Hagoort argue that propositional logic provides a more
satisfactory account of the computational level than probability theory, linking accounts
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based on logic to other levels through behavioral and neural data.
Three papers present contrasting views on the question of whether all three of Marr’s
levels are necessary. Bickle claims that advances in molecular biology and neuroscience
support reductionist explanations of cognitive functions which eliminates the need for
algorithmic and representational and computational explanations. In contrast, Bechtel and
Shagrir argue that each of Marr’s three levels makes an important and non-redundant
contribution to cognitive explanation, particularly in understanding environmental
inuences on cognitive mechanisms. Finally, Eliasmith and Kolbeck argue that, contrary to
some interpretations, Marr sought to integrate his three levels, with each providing
constraints on the others, and use their own work to demonstrate the integration of
high-level functional and detailed mechanistic explanations.
This summary of themes does not do justice to the integrative nature of many of the
contributions. For example, Love also touches on this issue of the necessity (or otherwise) of
all levels, while Gray Hardcastle and Hardcastle also consider relations between levels with
their neural model of cortico-striatal circuitry. However, it is clear from the contributions
that 30 years on many researchers still consider that Marr’s levels are essential to cognitive
scientic explanation. That is, there remains broad agreement that neither the
computational level nor the implementation level (alone or in conjunction) can provide a full
account of cognitive processes, and the algorithmic and representational level remains
essential to bridge between implementation and function.
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